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1 
Absolutist thesis about truth (Pascal Engel 
2011) 
• Truth is one, objective, absolute (not relative), not vague and not 
partial.  
 
My proposal:  
• Later Wittgenstein and Heidegger (combine philosophy of language and 
ontology) 
 
W:  family resemblance, language game, rule, rule-following problem 
H:    Dasein, distinction between truth as correspondence and truth as 
openness of Dasein (aletheia) 
Both W and H are what I call Normative Naturalists. (There are natural 
LGs, that is, natural normative practices, governed by (in general) 
implicit rules which themselves are natural.) 
2 
Positions about Truth (I) 
• Monism (« Truth is one »): A. The concept of 
truth is unambiguous (the nature of truth is 
uniform across discipline or sector of discourse). 
B. There is a single truth property that statements 
can have (the essence of truth).  
• Pluralism: A. The concept of truth is ambiguous 
(the nature of truth varies across discipline or 
sector of discourse). B. There is more than one 
truth property that statements can have.  
• Pluralist motivation: « ‘p’ is true » has different 
meanings and reasons for different statements p.  
 
3 
Positions about Truth (II) 
•  Truth « chauvinism » denies that all discourses are truth apt 
(e.g., expressivism in ethics).  
• Deflationism: truth is a « thin » (not substantive) property. 
Truth does not have any essence. The predicate « true » is a 
syntactical device (for instance, for Paul Horwich the predicate 
« true » is a generalization device). For Davidson (1996), truth 
is a primitive predicate which is implicitly defined by a theory 
of truth applied to the sentences of the language.  
Tarski’s  DS:    ‘p’ is true iff p 
In a sense, deflationist accepts the disunity of truth. 
• Functionalism: (for any statement x) x is true iff x has a 
property which plays the truth-role. (C. Wright (1992), M. 
Lynch (2001)) 
     
 
4 
Platitudes about truth, or the a priori 
role of truth 
 
Austin: theory of truth is given by a list of platitudes about truth.  
 
Crispin Wright (2001) 
• - transparency : to assert (believe) that p is to present p as true 
• - epistemic opacity : some truths may not be known or be unknowable 
• - embedding: truth aptness is preserved under various syntactic operations 
• - correspondence: for a proposition to be true is to correspond to reality 
• - contrast: a proposition may be true without being justified and vice versa 
• - stability: if a proposition is ever true, then it is always true 
• - absoluteness: truth is absolute, there are no degrees of truth 
 
Crispin Wright does not include the normativity of truth – truth is the correctness 
condition of belief – in this list of platitudes.  
M. Lynch: Platitudes define the “nominal truth” (concept of truth, not the real essence 
of truth).  
 
5 
Functionalist Dilemma 
• (A) Is truth a second-order property (the functional role) or (B) it is the realizer of 
the role?  
• If (A), then functionalism is similar to deflationism.  
• If (B), pluralism of realizers. Such extreme pluralism undermines the pluralist 
motivation.  
• Traditional functionalism cannot combine (A) and (B).  
• C. Wright (2001, 2003) and M.Lynch (2009, 2011) try to combine (A) and (B). They 
defend a form of pluralism - alethic functionalism: the concept of truth is one, but 
there are different properties of being true – different realizations of the concept 
of truth (correspondence, superwarrant, coherence, and so on). M. Lynch: « Truth 
is one and many. » 
• Pascal Engel (2012): alethic functionalism is incompatible both with the uniformity 
and substantiveness of the norm of truth for belief. It leads either to pluralism of 
norms of truth for belief or to deflationism)  
      
         Michael Lynch’s (2011) version of alethic functionalism : Truth as an immanent (in properties of being true) 
functional property.  
         An immanent property  is manifested by other properties, that is, it is a priori that its conceptually essential 
features are a subset of features of these properties. F is immanent in M: part of being M is being F. (So, the 
notion of immanent truth allows to connect the role and the realization.) 
 
6 
My (tentative) Wittgensteinian non-
metaphysical monism (pluralism) 
• Combine (A) and (B) pragmatically (or within NN).     →    not 
all realizers are acceptable (immanency of the truth-role is not yet immanency 
of the truth itself ) 
1). The concept of truth is unambiguous (and given by a list of platitudes 
about truth – the functional role of truth), but it has different uses-
« realizers » (against metaphysical monism), so that there is no single 
truth property, but a family of truth properties connected by a FR. The 
functional role of truth is pragmatically (naturalistically) anchored in its 
uses.   FR is a restriction on realizers of the role (against metaphysical 
pluralism and alethic pluralism).  
Ex. In ordinary life « correspondence to fact » is a truth property. (« ’Snow is 
white’ is true iff snow is white ».) In physics: correspondence to fact of 
nature. In mathematics: Correspondence to abstract object? 
2). In fact, I combine 1. with the substantive principle of correspondence 
because it is the most natural ordinary view on truth. (No FR between, 
e.g., anti-realist coherence and realist correspondence to fact.)  7 
Why correspondence? 
• It is one of the platitudes about truth. Moreover, I 
think, that it is the most basic platitude. Other 
platitudes can be deduced from it.  
Three basic platitudes about truth (M. Lynch) 
• Objectivity (truth is correspondence to fact) 
• Truth is the norm for belief (compatible with the view that 
truth itself is not a normative notion. But I think that it is.) 
• Truth is the aim (end) of inquiry 
    Close relations between these platitudes?  
 8 
Plan 
• Against pluralism of the concept of 
momentum in physics 
• Against pluralism and relativism of truth in 
physics (a few remarks) 
• Against pluralism of truth 
• The essence of truth 
 
9 
The concept of momentum in physics, 
p 
The concept p has different forms: 
• P=mv   (the Newtonian mechanics) 
• P=γmv  (the relativistic mechanics) 
• p= - i ћ∂/∂x  (the quantum mechanics) 
 
Physicist’s first intuition is monistic: there is 
momentum tout court 
Pluralistic intuition (philosophical): there are 
different concepts of momentum: pN  , pE , pQ  , … 
 
10 
A more subtle intuition refutes 
pluralism 
The pluralist intuition disappears if one takes 
into consideration the connections (explicit or 
implicit - pragmatic) between different forms 
of p: 
(pN  …. connections …. pE ) …. connections …. pQ  
 
What is the nature of the connections? Answer: the 
Wittgensteinian family resemblance.  
 
 
11 
The causes of pluralism 
• The cause of pluralism:  ignoring pragmatic 
connections between different uses of a concept (FR) 
• Two causes of this cause: 
Pure intellectualism  
Pure pragmatism (in the sense of the first-order pragmatics of 
language games. Pragmatism of relations between them – the 
second order pragmatics = semantics – is ignored) or extreme 
contextualism.  
 
12 
Meaning and meaning-use 
   
• I introduce the distinction between the meaning of a 
concept and the meaning-use of the concept (in a 
context)  there is a FR between uses 
• Both pure intellectualism and pure pragmatism ignore 
the semantic meaning – the meaning of a concept (but 
not in the sense of the purely « nominal meaning »: p 
is the quantity of mouvement).  
• The concept p is one, but it has different uses. 
• Smooth (invisible, natural) move from one form of the 
concept p to another form of it.  
 
13 
How to prove Wittgensteinian monism 
(FR between uses of p)? 
• FR is a pragmatic notion. FR is both natural 
and normative (justifiable) at the same time.  
It is helpful to clarify the notion of concept: 
• Concept = FR (Wittgenstein).  Concept = rule 
(W and Kant). So, FR= implicit common rule 
(W).   
Ex. pN  is a limit case of pE .  pQ   is obtained by 
quantization of pN  . And so on.  
 
14 
Generalization argument 
• Theory of relativity and quantum mechanics are 
generalizations of the Newtonian mechanics 
• So, the relativistic and quantum concepts are 
generalizations of the corresponding classical concepts 
• But what is generalization? Is talking about generalization 
justified?  
• I think: to understand generalization in terms of the 
Wittgensteinian problem of rule-following    
• To generalize a concept (rule) is to extend it to new 
domains of application  
• QM as a generalization of CM: the Hamiltonian super-
structure plays the role of a common rule for QM and CM. 
Quantization is just a change of aspect of this rule.  
 
15 
The process of development of science 
Theoretical level …FR…(extension of knowledge)   
 
FR                                    
 
 
Practical level …FR…(extension of knowledge) 
(Experiment, measurement, use of technology, and so on.)  
 
a natural normative process (in the sense of W’s NN) of extension of 
knowledge 
 
16 
Kantian synthetic unity of 
apperception 
• I think that we can also talk about the Kantian synthetic 
unity of apperception (a naturalized version of it is 
equivalent to the W-rule).  
• Robert Brandom (2011) gives an analytic interpretation 
of KSUA. 
• Three normative tasks to accomplish to integrate a new 
judgement into a SUA: (1) critique (exclude 
contradictions), (2) ampliative (deduce consequences), 
(3) justificatory (to justify the consequences and the 
whole system) 
• To apply a naturalized version of it to analyze the 
process of development of science. It is very similar.  
 
17 
The correspondence principle 
• The generalized principle of correspondence 
between CM and QM (due to Heisenberg) is 
the principle of generalization. 
• Equivalently: the principle of unity  
• FR, common implicit rule, common concept, 
generalization, natural extension, principle of 
correspondence, unity,… is the same 
18 
Conclusion about the concept of 
momentum, p 
• P is the quantity of mouvement – nominal (a priori) 
definition. This formal rule must be pragmatically 
anchored into its uses (→  W-rule).  
• The concept p is unambiguous. It refers to the W-rule 
for p (or FR « relation » between different uses of p).  
• There is no common property to all uses of p.  
• There are different properties of being p connected by 
a FR.  
• The disjunctive property  pN  or pE  or pQ  or  … is a post 
factum explicitation of a common implicit rule.  
 
19 
Pluralism/relativism of LGs, or pseudo-
pluralism/relativism in physics  
There are connections between pluralism, relativism, and contextualism. 
Pseudo-relativism:  
• (P =mv) is true from the point of view of N-LG and false from the point of view of E-LG.    
• (p = γmv) is false ………..true …..  
Contextualism: (P =mv) is true in N-context, and false in E-context. (p = γmv) is false …..true …..  (T. 
Williamson: contextualism is relativism tamed.)  
Absolutism: N-LG is a limit case (approximation, and so on) of E-LG. 
Cause of relativism: ignoring pragmatic connections.   
 
Historical pseudo-relativism 
• Ptolemy’s system vs Copernican system 
• « The Sun moves around the Earth » was a self-evident  hinge proposition. Now it is a 
false empirical proposition.  
• Pragmatic  view:  The Copernican system turned out to be superior. 
 
The inverse dependence between pluralism of p and pluralism of truth: (P =mv) is true 
(truth as correspondence?), (p = γmv) is true, (p= - i ћ∂/∂x) is true (truth as 
coherence?). P is one, but different uses. → Truth is one, but different uses.  
 
20 
Against Pluralism of Truth 
• Ordinary life truths 
• Truths in physics 
• Truths in mathematics  (2+2=4) 
• Truths in fiction  (Anna Karenina loved Wronski) 
• Moral truths? 
• Esthetical truths? 
• Jurisprudential truths? 
 
Pluralistic intuition: there are different kinds of truth (correspondence to a fact, 
coherence, superwarrant, social agreement, and so on).  
 
Pluralistic motivation: there are different reasons for being true, different meaning-
uses of ‘true’, different truthmakers in virtue of which true propositions are true  
 
To argue against pluralism we need a theory of truth, that is, a theory of properties of 
truth, including the trivialities about the use of the predicate ‘true’ and the 
ontological notions of truthmaker and supervenience of truth over being.  
 
21 
Mixed Inferences Argument 
(Williamson (1994), C.Tappolet (1997)) 
• (1) Waddling penguins are amusing. (This is a comic fact.) (2) That 
penguin waddles. (This is an ornithological fact.) (3) Therefore that 
penguin is amusing. (This is a comic fact.) 
• Pluralism: comic truths, ornithological truths 
• My interpretation: mixed inferences are direct material inferences 
from (2) to (3) (supervenience of the comic truth on the 
ornithological truth). There is FR between the comic and the 
ornithological truths (two uses of one and the same truth). 
• Deflationism « solves »  the problem superficially. 
• Tarski’s DS: « ‘p’ is true iff p » is just the formal rule for Aristotle’s 
substantive theory of truth as correspondence: 
     “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, 
while to say of what is that it is , or of what is not that it is not, is 
true” (Aristotle, Metaphysics Г 7.27 )   
 
 
22 
The Truth of “Mixed” Conjunctions  
The argument of mixed conjunctions is due to C. Tappolet (2000): 
“Each conjuct has to be true in the same way”.  
• ‘This cat is wet and it is funny.’ (Tappolet 2000) 
• ‘Waterboarding is painful and waterboarding is wrong.’  (M. Lynch) 
 
       Ex. An argument against realizer functionalism: for normative proposition and for 
non-normative one the concept of truth has two different kinds of realizers. If 
truth is the realizer, there are two different kinds of truth (say correspondence and 
warrant). What is the realizer (truth) of the conjunction?   
       M. Lynch also thinks that the realizer functionalism undermines one of   the 
motivations for adopting pluralism, since it implies that true propositions do not 
form a real kind.   
       I think that in both cases truth is correspondence to fact, but the  correspondence 
itself is realized differently.  
       Edwards (2008) argues that Tappolet’s problem is not only a problem for alethic functionalism/pluralism 
but also a problem for the correspondence theory of truth. But the correspondence theorist as well as 
alethic pluralist can account for the truth of conjunctions without the need to appeal to some generic 
truth property by holding that the truth of a conjunction is derivative, dependent upon the truth of each 
of its conjuncts, but not vice versa.  
     
 
       
 
23 
My proposal: to fill up Tarski’s DS (the truth-role) with 
pragmatic/naturalistic « substance », to connect it with 
the world 
• I transform Tarski’s DS into a W-rule of correspondence 
(comprising a set of paradigmatic cases of use of 
correspondence)   
• For any true proposition p « ’p’ is true iff p » is the following 
W-LG: « ’p’ is true is p », or « ’p’ is true is the same as p ».  
• Ultimately, the W-rule is anchored into a LG of its use.  
• The DS and the a priori conceptual role of truth naturally 
supervene (in the sense of being made explicit) on the 
assertive LG.  
• David Lewis (2001): the correspondence theory is a version 
of the redundancy (deflationist) theory. Identity theory is a 
version of correspondence theory. 
 
24 
The correspondence and the W-
spontaneity of a LG 
• A correspondence between a proposition (subject) and object is being established 
as a result of transformation (making explicit) of an (assertive) instinctive LG 
(having instinctive spontaneity) into reflective LG (having reflective spontaneity).   
• The correspondence can be more or less explicit (a LG has degrees of 
reflectiveness, or expliciteness). It is violated iff the reflective spontaneity is 
violated. (ex. a false proof in maths) 
• The rule of correspondence is just the explicitation of the spontaneity, and vice 
versa, the spontaneity is the implicit rule of correspondence. 
• The spontaneity is the pragmatic normativity.  
• The correspondence and the spontaneity of a LG are two sides of the same 
normative coin.  
• Hypothesis: truth is the norm of assertion. And ontologically, truth and knowledge 
are the same (thanks to the connection between LGinst and LGreflect).  So, the norm of 
truth for assertion is the norm of knowledge. (T. Williamson: knowledge is the 
unique essential norm of assertion)  
• Spontaneity is the pragmatic truth (truth is the sense of correctness of a rule-
following).  
• Tarski‘s formal rule misses the Wittgensteinian naturalistic spontaneity.  
25 
W’s instinctive LG = Heideggerian 
Dasein 
• Spontaneity  (LG)     …  openness of Dasein (the 
ontological essence of truth)  
• Degrees of reflectivity of a LG   …  degrees of 
openness of Dasein 
Heidegger: two kinds of truth: truth as 
correspondence and truth as openness of Dasein 
(aletheia). The former is grounded in the latter.  
Dasein knows itself.  
Heidegger: « The true is what is known. It is just 
what corresponds with the facts ».  
26 
C. Wright’s minimalism  
• Wright (1992, 1993, 2001) goes a bit beyond 
deflationism.  
• Wright’s inflationary argument : the norm of truth is 
distinct from warranted assertibility. It is substantive. 
• (For Lynch and other functionalists the norm of truth 
for belief or assertion is just a platitude: norm of the 
truth for assertion is being warranted). 
• The new norm (stronger than warranted assertibility) is 
superassertibility (a statement is superassertible 
(superwarranted) if some actually accessible state of 
information justifies its assertion and which will continue to 
do so no matter enlarged upon or improved.  
 
 27 
 
Truth is a norm of correctness distinct 
from warranted assertibility.   
 • (A) It is true that p iff p is warranted. (premiss) 
• (B) It is true that not p iff it is not true that p. 
(DS)  
• From (A and B): It is warrantedly assertible that 
not p iff it is not warrantedly assertible that p. 
(Conclusion) False. 
• Truth is a norm of correctness distinct from 
warranted assertibility. They diverge in 
extension. (Crispin Wright)  
28 
Pascal Engel’s Extended Realism (2007) 
• Wright’s minimalism is the default anti-realistic 
position (« realism has to be earned »). → pluralism (e.g., 
correspondence theory in physical world, superassertibility in ethics or 
mathematics)  
• Pascal Engel (2007, 2012): the norm of truth for belief 
and assertion registers the norm of knowledge.  
• Motivation: deontic interpretation of the norm of truth is 
problematic. Better: we ought to believe that P iff P is 
true and justified.  
     Classical epistemology: knowledge is true justified belief.  
 
29 
Truth is not a norm of rational belief? 
• The deontic interpretation  of the norm of truth for 
belief: a belief  that P is correct  iff P is true because we 
ought to believe that P iff P is true.  
• Wedgwood (2002): « according to this principle, any 
belief in a true proposition is correct even if the belief 
in question is grossly irrational; so how can this 
principle explain the norms of rational belief ?» 
• Another interpretation of the norm of truth is 
teleological: A belief that P is correct iff P is true 
because only true beliefs achieve aim involved in 
believing) 
30 
P. Engel’s proposal (2007, 2012): The norm of truth for 
belief and assertion is a norm of knowledge 
     We can talk about truth only in domains where we are able to 
know. 
• The concept of knowledge is unambiguous and substantive.  
• The norm of truth would be uniform and substantive (monism 
about the norm of truth, not necessarily monism about truth. 
Pluralist picture leads to a pluralism about the norm of truth (Engel 
2012)).  
• And such position is the default realism.  
• More unified account of truth.  
• Non-metaphysical monism: there is no single property of being 
true, but a single norm of truth. (Compare with my Wittgensteinian 
view.)  
• « Extended realism » is P. Engel’s proposal about the norm of truth 
together with his previous position – Minimal realism.  
 
 
31 
Pascal Engel’s Minimal Realism (2002) 
• (1) Truth is a “thin” notion satisfying the platitudes 
• (2) Truth is not simply a logical device 
• (3) Propositions or the contents of beliefs are truth-bearers. We need to 
have an independent account of these contents. 
• (4) It is not pluralistic, since truth has a uniform core-meaning defined by 
its role but which is realized in different ways from domain to domain. 
It also says that 
• (5) minimalism about truth does not imply minimalism about truth-
aptness 
• (6) In each domain, truth-aptness is to be judged after the realist criterion 
of the independence of a domain from our responses, and of verification 
transcendence: our best conceptions might be false. 
• (7) In each domain, realistic truth in the sense of (6) is the norm of our 
inquiries.    
(4), that is, ambiguous status of truth, leads to the same problem as truth 
functionalism. MR faces the Functionalist Dilemma.  
 
32 
Pascal Engel’s views   
• Combination of the functional role of truth with the substantive 
correspondist theory of truth. (Realism)   (in his talk 2011) 
• The concept of truth is given a priori by the platitudes about truth, but it 
has different uses-realizers.  
• Different kinds of correspondence realize the truth-role.  
• The importance of ontology: truth supervenes on truthmakers. (« Identity 
Makers » 2003) There is no theory of truth without a theory of being. 
• A proposition is true in virtue of a truthmaker.  
• Different kinds of truthmakers realize the correspondence and the truth-
role.  
• My proposal: P. Engel stays on the ontic level. We need to go to the 
properly ontological level of Dasein.  
• FR between different kinds of truthmakers.  Dasein is background.  Dasein 
(LG) in maths, in physics, in fiction, and so on. Correspondence is NN-
supervenience, explicitation.   
 
33 
Scope Problem (Lynch 2009) for the 
correspondence (representationalist) theory of 
truth. 
• Intuitively, the CTT (RTT) has a limited domain 
of application. (Prima facia, CTT cannot explain, for 
example, moral and mathematical truths which play the role 
of counterexamples.)   → pluralism  (CTT, warrant, coherence, 
…) 
• My proposal:  there is no FR between CTT, warrant, 
coherence, …, and the most natural (in the W sense) is the 
CTT.  Moral and maths truths can be incorporated into CTT 
either by a natural extending the latter or by naturalizing the 
former.  
• Edwards (2012) proposal: to use D. Lewis’ notions of natural 
properties and eligibility.   
 
 34 
Lewis vs Wittgenstein 
    My comparison 
• Lewis (1983): natural property (the members of 
the corresponding class share smth significant in 
common)   (natural theory, natural referent, natural 
relation of reference (T. Williamson)) 
• W: FR 
• Lewis (1983): eligibility (meaning is not simply 
matter of use. Naturalaness ought to be taken 
into consideration). 
• W: uses are governed by rules, they ought to be 
natural/spontaneous. Natural extension of uses.  
 
 35 
Douglas Edwards’ (2012) Solution to 
the Scope Problem (II) 
• Truth is a natural property in the Lewis sense.  
• But there is nothing in common between correspondence, 
warrant, coherence, and so on. And the conjunctive 
property or second-order property are not natural.   
• Which theory to choose? CTT is a natural theory.  
• How to be with counterexamples? The naturalness of CTT 
trump the counterexamples. According to the principle of 
eligibility a theory may not fit perfectly with language use.    
• May be they are not counterexamples at all.  
• I think this argument is similar to my Wittgensteinian 
argument above.  
36 
Conclusion 
I propose the following non-metaphysical monist theory of truth: 
 
• (A) Truth is the correspondence to fact.  
• (A) is a W-rule.  
• The norm of truth for beliefs and assertions is a norm of knowledge. 
• Ontologically truth and knowledge are the same.  
• The functional role of truth (the nominal concept of truth) is obtained as a 
result of an a priori conceptual analysis (making explicit) of its uses.  
• The truth-role is pragmatically/naturalistically anchored into its uses (the 
kinds of correspondence and truthmakers). 
• There are FR between uses of the predicate « true », which ultimately are 
grounded in Dasein.   
• Other theories of truth, such as coherence TT, warrant TT, superwarrant 
TT, and so on, are excluded because they are not natural (there is no FR 
between them and CTT).  
37 
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Thank you! 
                            
         Danke! 
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